On the subprime crisis
October 7th, 2008Over the past few months, the world’s central banks have been fighting a wild fire. When one flame was put out an even stronger one blew up some other place. And by and large the efforts of these monetary authorities can be judged as have been successful, albeit undesirable. We have seen the predominantly capitalist economies of the USA and Britain nationalizing banks in these countries. Now anyone who knows a bit about economics will tell you about 2 things that are good for any economy’s financial system; firstly it should be stable and secondly it should be free (from large scale government intervention). Sure in these turbulent times it would seem we can’t hold on to both ideals. The question is why, and the answer at first seems disarmingly simple. We can’t let the banks fail, so lets give up on the sovereignty.
There are 2 opposite ideas prevalent in conversations about bail outs and the likes. These are the idea of letting large banks fail vs the possible moral hazard a bail out would cause. I will just share my thoughts on both arguments.
As to the argument about big banks; there is a level of credibility to this argument. Some of the banks at risk of failing in the USA especially have quite a large chunk of that country’s banking market share. And their failure could hurt the US financial system. But is this reason enough to make tax payers pay for their risk taking? Consider for instance in the USA that banks are required by law to take out deposit insurance for all it’s deposits. So if these banks fail, the man on the street will not be hurt, so any bail out is really for shareholders who know that there are risks in buying shares, and not citizens. The second argument that bail out proponents propound is that such a large scale failure of banks could lead to a collapse of these countries’ financial systems and they quickly point to Asia to add extra weight to these claims. Firstly I would say, “the markets clear” and this is the quick retort that bank owners and managers threw around to governments when governments tried to regulate them more. This tune has changed quite fast. But it should not. The reason banks were able to sell these exotic derivatives in the first place was because they ignored the risk management processes that governments had advised them to take. Most notable among these is the Basel II accords having finalized in the early 2000’s very few market economies have headed these accords and this crisis might just be the result of poor risk management policies within these banks. So now why should governments who have always been told that the markets clear be expected to believe otherwise now? Secondly I would say the Asian situation is completely disanalogous with this current situation, especially if you consider the hardest hit economies in the current situation. The USA and Europe are fairly stable economies (on the most part) and it is ridiculous to think that we could ever see the kind of capital flight here that we saw in Asia, and the main reason is where would it go? When capital flies, it needs a place to land and the world without Europe and the USA would not be able absorb the kind of capital that we are talking about here. As well going back to my “the markets clear” statement. The market is starting to show signs of clearing in the United States. We have seen over the past few months, banks that were thought to be juggernauts being sold off. We can see that there is a market for cheap banks.And who is to say that by the time this is all over all these banks will not have been bought? So no, a financial market failure in the USA and Europe is highly unlikely, not because investors like what’s going on, but because they have no where else to go and because the market clears. And thirdly I would say even if one could prove that a market crash would happen, I would say Asia recovered and became more prudent at that, and these economies would do the same. Perhaps what they need is this kind of failure, so that they watch their risk taking a bit closer in future.
And as to the second argument of moral hazard; it is quite possible that moral hazard will occur as a result of a bail out. Because what a bail out says to these banks is that you have us by the balls. It says ” we can’t let you fail because you are too big”. With such sweeping statement to banks, well you might as well trow out the risk management codes, heck close down the risk management departments in these banks. The problem with a bail out is that it lets banks get away with it and that is a bad thing.